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Abstract 
 
  
This paper focuses on how the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary 
policies influenced non-financial firms. The paper’s two main contributions 
are, first, to shed light on non-financial firms’ decisions on leverage, and how 
the ECB’s conventional and unconventional policies may have affected 
them. Second, the paper also examines how these policies influenced non-
financial firms’ decisions on capital allocation – primarily capital spending 
and shareholder distribution (for example, dividends and shares 
repurchases). Towards this end, we use an exhaustive and unique dataset 
comprised of income statements and balance sheets of leading non-financial 
firms that operate in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
The main results suggest that ECB’s monetary policies have encouraged 
firms to raise their debt burden especially after the global recession of 2008. 
Finally, the ECB’s policies, mainly after 2011, seem to have also stimulated 
non-financial firms to allocate more resources towards not only capital 
spending but also shareholder distribution 
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1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, one of the main problems faced by developed countries has been the 
combination of slowing economic growth and lack of inflation in an environment of 
zero lower bound on interest rates. Summers (2013) brought back the term Secular 
Stagnation – first coined by Hansen (1939) – to describe the economic environment in 
the United States (US) since the 2008-2009 Global Financial Recession. This term 
implies that central banks cannot slash interest rates enough to boost investment and 
consumption. Indeed, the situation where a central bank is hitting the zero-lower bound 
is known “liquidity trap” and has fostered vast literature where the effectivity of 
different fiscal and monetary policies (central bank’s extraordinary monetary measures, 
among them) to boost economic activity has been examined. See, for example, 
Krugman (1998), Krugman and Eggertsson (2012), Orphanides (2004), Bernanke and 
Reinhart (2004), and Koo (2011, 2013), to name a few.  
 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
countries –who, unlike the US, are not part of a fiscal union, but only of a monetary one 
– faced a similar plight. So, the responsibility of the European Central Bank (ECB) to 
stimulate the euro area economy has been higher than that of the Federal Reserve and 
has therefore been translated into a full bunch of different conventional and 
unconventional monetary policies. Summing up, in 2011-2012, after the worst years of 
the European sovereign debt crisis, the ECB tried to boost liquidity in financial markets 
by introducing the Securities Markets Program (SMP) – first announced in May 2010 – 
whose objective was to inject funds into specific market segments that were suffering 
from insufficient liquidity and depth1. The SMP, unlike a quantitative easing program, 
only injected funds to small and somewhat fewer liquid markets that engulfed with 
high-risk premium.  On July 26, 2012, Mario Draghi (who entered office as President of 
the ECB on November 2011), promised to do  “whatever it takes” to preserve the Euro 
with the aim to rekindle economic growth in the EMU (Draghi, 2012). Since then, the 
ECB has introduced several conventional and unconventional stimulating monetary 
policy measures. Some of these policies include slashing interest rates (including 
cutting its cash rate to zero and the deposit rate to -0.4% by March 2016), implementing 
both the longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO) and targeted longer-term 
refinancing operations (TLTRO), and introducing quantitative easing programs or QE. 
The main QE programs introduced include the public sector purchase program (PSPP), 
the asset-backed securities purchase program (ABSPP), a covered bond purchase 
program (CBPP3), and the corporate sector purchase program (CSPP). As of January 
2018, the PSPP was the most massive program among all the assets purchase programs 
the ECB has implemented with over 1.9 trillion euros in holdings, and it accounts for 
                                                
1 This program included buying sovereign bonds from five distressed EMU countries: Italy, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece.   In 
November 2011, the ECB also launched the CBPP 2, which extended CBPP1, aiming to purchase additional covered bonds. After 
the arrival of Draghi, however, these programs were phased out – the SMP purchases ended in February 2012 and as under the 
CBPP ended in October 2012.   
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over 82% of the total asset purchase programs. Table 1 summarizes the most significant 
announcements regarding the conventional and unconventional monetary policies 
implemented by the ECB during the recent period. 
 
  [Insert Table 1 here]  
 
In this context, this paper aims to examine whether ECB’s conventional and 
unconventional monetary policies in times of crisis influenced non-financial firms’ 
decisions. Specifically, the paper focuses on three critical issues: Leverage, investments 
and shareholders distribution (which comprises primely of dividends and shares 
buybacks). The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is twofold. First, it 
examines how ECB monetary policies in times of crisis have affected non-financial 
firms’ decisions on leverage. Second, it analyzes how those policies have influenced 
non-financial firms’ decisions on capital allocation – primarily capital spending and 
shareholder distribution (for example, dividends and shares repurchase). To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first paper to take such a deep dive into the study of the 
effects of the ECB’s policies on non-financial firms. To that end, we use an exhaustive 
and unique dataset comprised of income statements and balance sheets of leading non-
financial firms that operate in EMU countries.  
 
The main results suggest that the ECB’s conventional and unconventional policies 
encouraged firms to raise their debt burden especially after the global recession of 2008. 
Moreover, the ECB’s monetary policies – mainly after 2011 in the wake of the 
European economic crisis and as the ECB shifted its monetary policy as Mario Draghi 
entered office – seem to have also stimulated non-financial firms to allocate more 
resources towards not only capital spending but also shareholders distribution.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes a literature review of 
the effects of the ECB’s monetary policies on non-financial firms. Section 3 presents 
the analytical framework. Section 4 describes the data used in the paper. Section 5 
explains the econometric methodology while Section 6 reports the empirical results. 
Finally, Section 7 presents the concluding remarks and suggests some possible policy 
implications.    
 
2. The ECB’s monetary policies’ effects on non-financial firms   
 
An extensive literature has studied the impact of ECB’s policies since 2011 from 
different perspectives and using different methodologies; however, only a few papers 
have focused on its effects on non-financial corporations despite its crucial role in the 
economy2. Lenza et al. (2010) and Giannone et al. (2012a and 2012b) focus on the 
impact of the ECB’s monetary policy on macroeconomic variables by applying VAR 
methods. Peersman (2011) and Gambacorta et al. (2014) examine the relations between 
                                                
2 According to Eurostat, non-financial firms account for nearly 58% of the total gross added value in the Euro Area and 55% of 
Euro Area’s gross fixed capital formation (2002-2017 average).  
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the ECB’s balance sheet and macroeconomic conditions. They estimate a panel of eight 
advanced economies and show that a surprise rise in a central bank’s balance sheet – 
mostly via QE programs – would raise liquidity (supply side), mainly in countries 
where central banks are already hitting the zero-lower bound and under the prevailing 
conditions following the global economic crisis of 2008. Cycon and Koetter’s (2015) 
research suggests that the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy reduces refinancing 
costs. Although it does not lower loan rates; the ECB’s policy does mitigate the rise in 
loan prices because of higher credit demand.  
 
Besides this extensive literature, only a few papers attempted at showing the link 
between non-financial corporations’ investments in the EMU and the ECB’s monetary 
policy. Kanga and Levieuge (2017) assess the effects of the different ECB’s 
unconventional monetary policies on the cost of credit of non-financial firms in each 
EMU country. Daetz et al. (2016) focus, albeit not exclusively, on the impact of the 
ECB’s LTROs on non-financial firms’ cash holdings and concluded that the ECB’s 
measures were most beneficial to corporations from peripheral countries. Darracq-
Paries and De Santis (2015), who look at the effects of the 3-year long-term refinancing 
operations (LTROs) by considering them as a credit supply shock, show that LTROs 
have helped to elevate the growth rate of real GDP and to raise the prospects of loan 
provisions for non-financial firms. Arce et al. (2018) show that the ECB’s CSPP appear 
to encourage Spanish firms to issue more bonds and use these funds to increase real 
investment.  Finally, according to Ferrando et al. (2015) small and medium enterprises 
– that are more reliant on local bank credit – are more harshly impacted by the euro 
area’s credit crisis than large companies that were able to seek funding aboard. This 
result is more evident in the stressed countries (Spain, Italy Greece Portugal, and 
Ireland) than in the rest of the EMU countries.  
 
On the whole, the existing literature that has already focused on the effects of ECB’s 
unconventional monetary policy on non-financial corporations is not only scarce but has 
not focused on how the different types of policy measures affected companies’ 
decisions on capital structure and capital allocation. This paper will try to fill this gap in 
the literature.  
 
3. Analytical framework  
 
In order to better analyze how the ECB’s monetary policy affected non-financial firms, 
in this Section, we first review the literature on the optimal choice of the firm’s capital 
structure in order to examine whether those models might shed some light on the 
relationship between interest rates and companies’ leverage. Then, we examine more 
deeply how interest rates could influence a firm’s decision to allocate its capital 
between investments and profits distribution – via dividends and buybacks, or a 
combination of the two.  
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3.1. Capital structure 
 
One of the first studies on the optimal choice of the firm’s capital structure is the 
seminal paper by Modigliani and Miller (1958) who propose the “leverage theorem”. 
The theorem states that, in a context of asymmetric information between companies and 
investors, a firm determines its leverage ratio based on the capital cost and access to 
finance. However, since then a couple of other alternative theories was proposed by 
other authors later [Myers (1984), Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) or Merton (1974), to 
name a few]. Myers (1984) frame a company’s choice under the “pecking order” theory 
which points out that firms prefer internal funds such as retained earnings to external 
financing, and debt to equity. Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) offer a competing view 
(the “trade-off” theory); this view assumes every company achieves an optimal capital 
structure (a “debt target”) at any point in time and trade off tax advantages from debt 
against refinancing risk. Other authors consider market conditions – including interest 
rates – as a variable that might influence companies’ decision on their capital structure. 
Merton (1974), for example, examine from a theoretical perspective how changes in 
macroeconomic conditions influence companies on matters such as debt, while Barry et 
al. (2008) examine this subject albeit empirically. Based on their research, in general, 
lower interest rates should allow companies to increase their leverage as they reduce 
their borrowing costs.  
 
The theories mentioned above have different implications, not only in the reasons 
underneath the company’s decision to issue more debt but also in the effects that 
interest rate changes have on that decision. Although there is no consensus on the effect 
that interest rate changes have on capital structure decisions, our aim in this paper is not 
to explore the accuracy of those models. However, we aim to use them as a background 
to build up an econometric framework to examine how those changes may impact 
firms’ leverage decisions.   
 
3.2. Capital spending, dividends, and buybacks 
 
One of the ECB’s goals through its extraordinary monetary policies was to boost 
investment. This goal has a simple underlying logic that investments and interest rates 
are negatively correlated. This logic is prominent in a simple Keynesian IS-LM model 
where interest rate and its coefficient of interest sensitivity determine investment: 
𝐼 =  𝐼 ̅ + 𝑑𝑟    
 
In the above equation d>0 stands for the coefficient of interest sensitivity and, under 
normal economic conditions, falling interest rates should lead to higher investments and 
lift the aggregate demand to a higher equilibrium. This relationship between interest 
rates and investment has mainly been examined from an empirical perspective in the 
literature and its evolution in EMU countries from 1999 until the present is in Figure 1. 
This Figure shows that it is not clear-cut in the euro area since it only suggests a limited 
relationship between investments and yields (the correlation over the period is not 
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significant, although the fall in interest rates since 2014 coincided by a steady rise in 
investment in EMU countries). 
 
[Insert figure 1 here]  
 
Nonetheless, the aim of this paper goes beyond that relationship, since the goal is to 
analyze not only the effect of interest rates on investments but also on dividends and 
buybacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that examines how 
companies change their capital allocation among investments, buybacks, and dividends 
due to changes in interest rates. We present below a simple analytical framework to 
better understand those relationships and the underlying assumptions behind them.  
 
Let us consider that a company, which already took on a debt obligation, needs to 
decide how to allocate its resources. Specifically, consider a company that needs to 
evaluate how much to invest in a particular project – noted as I – versus how much it 
should allocate towards returning capital to shareholders – in the form of dividends or 
buyback and noted as 𝑉– over a timeframe of two periods: 
 
 𝑍𝑖 =
𝜋(𝐼)
1+𝑟
+ 𝜌𝑉                                            (1) 
 
 𝑍𝑖 is the added value to the company’s stock price, which the firm aims to maximize. 
The firm has a budget constraint of: 
 
                                      1 = I + 𝑉                                                (2) 
 
This constraint means that the company has to use all its resources towards an 
investment I in a particular project or paying its shareholders via dividends or buybacks 
– noted as V – or a combination of both (we are assuming that there are no other 
alternatives, for example, keeping the capital in cash). 
 
The investment I will yield a return in time one of a profit of 𝜋(𝐼) – a convex, 
continuous function of  I – (let us assume that the company can allocate any portion it 
desires towards a particular project). This profit will need to be discounted with 1 + 𝑟. 
Where r in this equation stands for the company’s cost of debt. For simplicity, assume 
that r stands for the prevailing market interest rates (in other words, the company’s risk 
premium over the market is zero). Conversely, the company can allocate 𝑉 towards 
shareholders via dividends or buybacks. This shareholder distribution has a positive and 
constant return set to 𝜌. This parameter represents the added value associated from a 
company repurchasing its stocks back or paying dividends to its investors. Put 
differently, we consider that profit distribution creates value to its shareholders in the 
form of a signaling mechanism about the positive prospects of a company’s future 
returns – especially if the company’s value is undervalued according to the company’s 
management. This positive correlation could be explained by agency costs, information 
asymmetries, and market irrationality, as Fairchild (2006) points out. In other words, a 
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shares buyback could signal to investors a company is doing well, and its stock is 
undervalued. This signal will justify a specific return for the company, over time, for 
these profits’ distributions3. In this vein, the empirical research that has been done on 
this matter has also shown the positive relationship between buybacks and stock prices 
[see Wang et al. (2008), McNally (1999) and Gup and Nam (2001)]. However, with 
regards to the relation between dividends and firm valuation (as Black and Scholes 
(1974) examine in detail), the empirical research is not conclusive. In particular, Denis 
and Osobov (2008) use an international comparison to show minimal empirical 
evidence for a signaling effect for dividend-paying companies; while Wood and 
Frankfurter (2002) and Bernhardt et al. (2005) call into question the validity of 
signaling theories for dividends4. In any case, for our model, we consider shares 
buybacks and their more established positive relation with firm’s value to justify a 
company’s decision to allocate capital towards them over investing5. In the econometric 
estimation, however, we use a broader term: “shareholder yield” that includes 
dividends, buybacks and deleveraging. With these methods, firms can return value to 
investors as a signaling mechanism.   
 
Given these assumptions, we can solve the firm’s maximization problem6 to know how 
it distributes its capital in time zero between V and I, based on prevailing market interest 
rates. The Lagrangian equation is: 
 
ℒ =
𝜋(𝐼)
1+𝑟
+ 𝜌𝑉 +  λ(I + 𝑉 − 1)                                  (3) 
 
The First order condition (FOC) for the investment is: 
 
𝜋′(𝐼) = −λ(1 + 𝑟)                                                  (4) 
 
 
While the FOC for the shareholder distribution is: 
 
−𝜌 = λ                                                                     (5) 
 
These two FOCs before accounting for the λ budget constraint leads to: 
                                                
3Dividends tend to be “stickier”; furthermore, even if market conditions are not good, a company will be more incline to maintain its 
dividend not to alarm investors from a possible selloff of the stock. Conversely, if a company faces a transitory gain then it will be 
more incline to distribute its windfall through buybacks rather than raise dividend and thus lift expectations about future dividend. 
That could explain the rise in the prevalence of buybacks as they have become more ubiquitous in recent years mainly, however not 
solely, in the United States.  
4 Conversely, the research done by Hussainey et al (2011) and Garrett, and Priestley (2002) supported the positive relation between 
dividends and share prices. 
5 Even when interest rates fall, both investments and shareholders yield could remain subdued due to low productivity and earnings 
growth – because expected lower growth leads to lower growth in investments. If companies face higher capital costs due to 
heightening risk in the markets (as measured, in one way, via Weighted Average Cost of Capital, WACC), they may opt out of 
taking risk even as interest rates continue to decline. Conversely, falling equity pricing tend to prop up dividend yields. Lower 
equity prices could also lead to repurchasing stocks over investing for some companies. Finally, when it comes to banks, they  have 
been more reluctant to provide loans, in part, because of the new capital restrictions (e.g. Basel III) and for them being more prudent 
after the financial global crisis of 2008 (this could explain the rise in the variance of the interest rates on loans in recent years).  
6 This maximization problem does not account for the difference between growth companies and value companies. Where the 
former tends to allocate more towards investments and the latter tends to prioritize shareholder distribution.   
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𝜋′(𝐼)
(1+𝑟)
= 𝜌                                                                 (6) 
 
The solution shows that a company assesses a project based on two parameters: 𝜌 the 
company’s return to shareholders, and  𝑟. Therefore, a company divides its resources 
between investments and shareholders distribution until the discounted marginal return 
on a given project is equal to the added value a dividend or buyback has on a company’s 
stock price. This is the framework that might help us understand how monetary policy 
changes could impact non-financial firms’ decisions on capital expenditure and 
shareholder yield7.  
 
4.  Data  
 
We gathered the data directly related to the companies’ financials from Bloomberg. We 
focus on non-financial firms listed in the leading stock exchanges from the four largest 
economies in the EMU: Germany, France, Spain, and Italy (and fair out as a good 
representation for the entire EMU because their aggregate GDP accounted for roughly 
75% of EMU’s GDP in 2017) from 2000 to 2017 [Deutsche Börse (DAX), BME 
Spanish Exchanges (IBEX35), Borsa Italiana (FTSE MIB), Euronext Paris (CAC40)]. 
Explicitly, we gather quarterly data from a total of 62 non-financial firms (banks and 
insurance companies are excluded) that register a market capitalization of 2 trillion 
euros at the beginning of 2017 (which represents nearly a third of the total market 
capitalization of non-financial firms in the four leading stock exchanges). Therefore, our 
analysis focuses on large-cap companies since, although their number is not high, they 
represent a sizable portion of the market value of publicly traded non-financial firms in 
the EMU.  
 
For our analysis, we use three main dependent variables: “CapEx-to-sales”, “Debt-to-
equity” and “Shareholder yield8” that capture capital spending, leverage, and capital 
distribution to shareholders, respectively. Figures 2 and 3 show the high correlation 
between the first two variables behavior in the 62 companies included in the sample and 
in the four largest economies in the EMU (Germany, France, Spain and Italy) while a 
detailed description of them, together with the rest of the variables used in our analysis, 
is in Appendix A.  
 
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 here] 
 
                                                
7 To examine how these relationships work, we run simulations under different assumptions and investment functions. The results 
of these simulations suggest under the baseline parameters, as r falls, companies tend to allocate more towards investment over 
shareholders returns. However, as 𝜌 rises and interest rates fall, the tradeoff between investment and shareholder distribution tends 
to flatten. In other words, if the added value to shareholder is high enough mainly in low interest rates environment, a further fall in 
interest rate will not encourage firms to allocate more resources towards investments over shareholder distribution. Conversely, if  𝜌 
is low, investment allocation is more likely to crowd out shareholder distribution as interest rates decline.  
8 Because of data restrictions, we use the total amount a company returns to its shareholders by distributing dividends, repurchase 
shares or paying back debt as a proxy of the “shareholder yield”. 
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To produce a data matrix without missing values, we apply two complementary 
procedures: the technique of multiple imputation developed by King et al. (2001) 
(which permits the approximation of missing data and allows us to obtain better 
estimates) and the simultaneous nearest-neighbor predictors proposed by Fernández-
Rodríguez et al. (1999) (that infers omitted values from patterns detected in other 
simultaneous time series). 
 
As for the monetary policy independent variables, we use changes to the ECB’s assets 
and the 3-month Euribor interest rate. The ECB’s assets are used because they show the 
different policy measures the ECB has employed over the years concerning changes to 
its balance sheet. This variable does not distinguish the different policy schemes such as 
LTRO, TLTRO, PSPP, ABSPP, CBPP3, and CSPP9. These programs have different 
targets, starting points, budgets and some have even winded down in recent years. 
However, all these policies aim to boost liquidity and reduce borrowing costs. 
Moreover, since late 2014 the majority of the growth in the ECB’s assets is attributed to 
the PSPP.  Appendix B includes further details about their progression. As such, we 
pick the changes to the ECB assets to show how these conventional and unconventional 
policies, without distinction, affect companies’ decisions. We then use the 3-month 
Euribor as a proxy of the ECB’s direct impact on interest rates. We decided to use this 
variable rather than the ECB’s deposit rate because it has a more direct connection to 
the interest rates faced by companies (nonetheless, Appendix C shows that they are 
highly correlated). 
  
Finally, we also take into account that two substantial economic events occured during 
our sample period: (1) the global economic recession of 2008 and (2) the peak of the 
European debt crisis in 2011-2012, that not only could have played a substantial role in 
swaying European companies’ decisions but might have also determined the ECB’s 
monetary policy (another important event occurred in late 2011 – the entrance of Mario 
Draghi to the ECB as president that has changed the direction of the ECB’s monetary 
policy). Based on the above, we decided to split the sample into two points in time to 
capture these major events: 2008Q1 (we set this quarter as a tipping point in time for the 
global economic recession), and 2011Q3 (we decided to set 2011Q3 to examine not 
only whether the European debt crisis may have had an impact on the results but also if 
Mario Draghi’s ECB leadership had affected them). In total we have five different time 
frames that we have examined: The first covers the period 2000Q2-2008Q1; the second 
spans from 2008Q2 to 2017Q4; the third ranges from 2000Q2 to 2011Q3; the fourth 
spans between 2011Q4 and 2017Q4; and the last one covers the entire period from 
2000Q2 to 2017Q4.  
  
5. Econometric Estimation  
 
                                                
9 A breakdown of the different QE programs is offered in Table B1.  
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Based on the theoretical framework laid out in Section 4 we estimate the econometric 
models to examine the role of monetary policy in determining firms’ capital spending, 
leverage and shareholder payouts. Our panel data analysis relies on Blundell and Roulet 
(2013) who looked at 4,000 global companies and examined the impact of low interest 
rates – which directly resulted from the monetary policies of central banks including the 
Federal Reserve, the ECB and Bank of Japan in recent years–  on their investments. 
They conclude that, since capital spending depends on the cost of equity and 
uncertainty,  low interest rates and tax benefits incentivizes long-term investment 
(because debt finance is cheap, companies have an incentive to borrow and carry out 
buybacks –also known as de-equitation–)10  
   
5.1.  Leverage 
 
Two of the most widely models used in the literature to analyze the way a company 
decides on its capital structure are the tradeoff model of Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) 
and the pecking order model of Myers (1984). The former model looks at a company’s 
aim to raise its debt load until it reaches a specific debt ratio target, whilst according to 
the latter model, a company will first exhaust its internal funds (available cash) before 
raising funds from debt and equity. However, these two models neither analyze the 
relationship between interest rates and the company’s decisions on debt as described in 
Section 3.1, nor examine the role of macroeconomic or monetary policy factors (such as 
QE programs) on the capital structure of firms. Therefore, following Kühnhausen and 
Stiber (2014)11, in our model, we incorporate external variables that could influence a 
company’s decision on its debt-to-equity ratio (𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is the dependent variable in the 
model which measures the company’s debt burden or leverage):  
 
𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑍𝑡−1  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (7)  
 
  
As equation 7 shows, our model includes three prime independent variables. The first (X 
vector) corresponds to microeconomic variables that are attributed to each company  –
they are also realted to tradeoff and pecking order models–. The second  (Y vector) 
comprises macroeconomic variables that may proxy the changes in the economy. 
Finally, the third (Z vector) includes variables which are directly or indirectly related to 
ECB’s monetary policy and proxy supply-side developments12.   
 
For our purposes, the monetary policy variables (Z vector) are the most important ones. 
They include the ECB’s asset levels – a proxy to the ECB’s asset purchase programs 
                                                
10 The issue of leveraged buybacks in sovereign debt has been examined by Baglioni (2015), however the process of leveraged 
buybacks of non-financial firms in times of QE programs is less researched. 
11
Their model is based on Rajan and Zingales (1995) and include five macroeconomic factors: GDP per capita, the growth rate of 
GDP (in constant local currency), inflation rate, interest rate, and tax rate. 
12 All independent variables, except WACC, lag the dependent variable by one period.  
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and loans– and changes in 3-month Euribor interest rate. Since the ECB added more 
funds to the economy and brought down interest rates to encourage companies to take 
on more loans, we should expect a negative correlation between companies’ leverage 
and interest rates and a positive correlation with the changes in the ECB’ assets. 
Regarding the microeconomic variables (X vector), three variables are included in the 
model: profitability (EBITDA-to-sales), growth in profits (growth in earnings per share 
or EPS) and WACC. We include the variables profitability and growth in profits as they 
play an important role in determining the leverage of a company as described by both 
Myers (1984) and Kraus and Litzenberger (1973)13 while the cost of capital (estimated 
by the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)) is a critical variable in this kind of 
models and a negative relationship between it and the leverage ratio should be expected. 
Finally, as regards the macroeconomic variables (Y vector), we have included the 
inflation rate in the EMU because, since inflation depreciates the debt value in real 
terms, we should expect a positive relationship between inflation and leverage.  
  
5.2 Capital spending and shareholder’s yield 
 
To analyze the relationship between ECB’s monetary policy and the developments of 
capital spending and shareholder yields we have adjusted the Blundell and Roulet’s 
(2013) model who conducted a panel data analysis and estimated two regressions (one 
for capital spending per sales and another for dividends and buybacks per sales). 
Therefore, we have also estimated two equations (an investment equation (8) and a 
shareholder yield equation (9)), but have adjusted their model by including variables 
that show how monetary policy affects capital expenditure and dividends/buybacks: 
 
 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑆𝑡−1  + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑃𝑡−1  + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (8)        
 
 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝐸𝐶𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝑖,𝑡    (9)            
 
In equation (8), the dependent variable is the company’s capital spending divided by 
sales (𝐶𝑖,𝑡). The regression also includes the two main ECB policy variables –the cost of 
debt (it-1 which is proxied by 3-months Euribor rate) and the changes in the ECB’s 
assets (ECBt-1) – plus another four independent variables: the cost of capital (ki,t-1, 
measured by the WACC), changes in profits (Ei,t-1 proxied by EBITDA-to-Sales), the 
inflation rate in the EMU (Pt-1), and the spread between long-term and short-term yields 
(St-1)
14.  
 
By including the last two variables, we aim to test changes to the economy and market 
expectations that are directly linked to the ECB’s policies all awhile still including 
variables related to the ones Blundell and Roulet use in their analysis. In particular, 
inflation serves as a proxy for changes in demand and monetary policy. Nonetheless, the 
                                                
13 The empirical evidence is also divided: Fama and French (2002) show that companies with higher profits tend to be less 
leveraged – putting the pecking order model right on this issue; Wald (1999) reaches a similar conclusion. On the other hand, Frank 
and Goyal (2008) show the opposite. 
14 The spread between 10-years weighted average of sovereign bond yields of all EMU countries and 3-month Euribor rate. 
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relationship between inflation and capital spending is not clear. On the one hand, higher 
inflationary pressures may lead the real returns (see Fama and Gibbons, 1982) on 
projects to be less profitable15, but on the other, a rise in the rate of inflation might also 
indicate higher economic activity. With regards the spread between long- and short-term 
rates, it is used as a proxy of economic conditions. According to Baumeister and Benati 
(2010), the compression of long-term bond spread may even impact GDP and inflation. 
Furthermore, this compression tends to indicate a fall in the term premium. The decline 
in the term premium could be due to lower expectations of either sudden inflation 
eruptions or future lower interest rates because of slower economic activity in the 
future. In other words, a contracting spread, or the flatting of the yield curve, may 
correspond with companies reducing capital spending as economic activity deteriorates. 
Therefore, we would expect a positive relationship between capital expenditure and 
bond yield spread.  
 
As stated before, our model includes an investment equation (8) and a shareholder yield 
equation (9) where the variables that may affect the shareholder yield (yi,t) are explored.   
Likewise equation (8), equation (9) also includes the two main ECB policy variables –
the cost of debt (it-1) and the changes in the ECB’s assets (ECBt-1) – plus another two 
independent variables: the cost of capital (ki,t-1 measuread by WACC) and changes in 
profits (Ei,t-1 proxied now by earnings per sale or EPS of each company). A positive 
relationship is expected for the former variable (if the cost of retaining a euro to invest 
relative to the cost of bonds rises, a company is better off repurchasing its shares – and 
reducing its relative rising cost of capital). Finally, regarding the latter variable, 
although Blundell and Roulet (2013) use earnings yield in their model, we decided to 
use changes in EPS because it isolates the changes in a company’s fundamentals by not 
including the variations in its underlying stock price (which could shift based on 
changes to liquidity in the markets, supply and demand changes and more). As for the 
expected relationship, even though there is no consensus in the literature16, we still 
expect rising earnings leading to higher returns to investors. 
 
6. Empirical results 
 
In this section, we first discuss the results from the panel data analysis applied to the 
leverage, the investment and the shareholder yield regressions. Concretely, we consider 
two basic panel regression methods: the fixed-effects (FE) method and the random 
effects (RE) model17. To determine the empirical relevance of each of the potential 
methods for our panel data, we test FE versus RE. We do so by using the Hausman test 
statistic to analyze the non-correlation between the unobserved effect and the regressors. 
                                                
15 Although Rappaport and Taggart (1982) alluded that companies might not include inflation in their decision process when 
evaluating a project.   
16 According to French and Fama (2002), more profitable firms tend to have higher dividend payments. Eije and Megginson (2008) 
looked into European companies and showed that rising earnings didn’t raise the chances of increases in cash payoffs to investors. 
Even Miller and Modigliani (1961) point out that rising profits do not necessarily lead to a rise in dividend payment – it will depend 
on other factors such as the payout ratio.  
17 Estimations were also performed by the Arellano-Bond GMM approach, rendering similar quantitative results. 
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This test indicates that the fixed effects estimators are more appropriate for all the 
timeframes in the leverage and the investment regression. However, in the shareholder 
yield model, the Hausman test shows that the best method (FE or RE) to be used 
changes depending on the subsample. Subsequently, we also present the results 
corresponding to a cross-country and a cross-sector analysis for the whole period (it has 
also been estimated using panel data techniques and in each case the Hausman test has 
been used to select the best methodology – FE or RE) in order to examine whether 
companies from different countries or industrial sectors have different reactions to 
ECB’s policies. 
 
6.1 Panel unit root tests 
 
A dependent stationary variable cannot be explained using non-stationary variables 
since the statistical properties of the former (mean, variance, autocorrelation, et cetera) 
remain constant over time while the statistical properties of the latter change over time.  
Therefore, to assess the statistical characteristics of our variables, we perform a variety 
of unit roots tests in panel datasets. In particular, we use the Levin–Lin–Chu (2002), 
Harris–Tzavalis (1999), Breitung (2000), Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003), and Fisher-type 
(Choi 2001) tests. The results from these tests (which are shown in Appendix D) 
decisively reject the null hypothesis of a unit-root for all the variables except for the 
ECB assets. Therefore, while the rest are found to be stationary in levels, the latter can 
be treated as the first-difference stationary. So, in the different empirical estimations it 
will be transformed into a stationary variable by differencing it. 
  
6.2  Leverage: Empirical results  
 
The results regarding the main drivers of the leverage ratio are presented in Table 2. 
 
 [Insert Table 2 here]  
 
These results indicate that interest rates and changes to the ECB’s balance sheet have a 
positive impact on companies’ leverage. For the entire period (column 5), a one 
percentage point fall in 3-months Euribor tends to lift the debt-to-equity ratio, on 
average, by 3.46 percentage points. Moreover, for every 1 trillion euros the ECB adds to 
its balance sheet, via the various LTRO and QE programs, companies are likely to raise 
their debt ratio, on average, by 0.17 percentage point. A closer examination of the 
results also reveals that the ECB’s policies have a stronger marginal effect on 
companies’ debt-to-equity ratio after 2011Q3 (column 2) and 2008Q1 (column 4). 
Specifically, the 3-months Euribor coefficients in column 4 (-3.968) and column 2 (-
2.495) are much lower than the coefficients in column 3 (-0.655) and column 1 (-1.174). 
As for changes in the ECB’s assets, the coefficients are much higher in column 4 and 2 
compared to column 1 and 3. The inflation rate, which is another variable that is 
indirectly affected by monetary policy, also presents positive and significant 
coefficients across the different time frames. Finally, the overall regressions’ fit is 
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satisfactory as measured by the R2 values. They range from 66.7% to 83.3% for the 
various time frames.   
 
 
6.3 Capital spending: Empirical results 
 
The results corresponding to the investment equation are presented in Table 3. It can be 
observed that ECB’s policies (both changes in interest rates and balance sheet assets) 
have a significant and stimulating impact on a company’s capital spending across the 
different time frames. In particular, from 2001 to 2017 (column 5) for every 1 trillion 
euros buildup in the ECB’s assets, the capital-spending-to-sales ratio rises, on average, 
by 2.98 percentage points. As for interest rates, a decline of one percentage point in the 
3-months Euribor tends to raise the CapEx-to-sales ratio, on average, by 1.5 percentage 
points.    
 
[Insert Table 3 here]  
 
A comparison of the different sub-periods reveals that the ECB’s policies related to its 
interest rates have a stronger marginal impact after 2011Q3. Specifically, based on the 
results in column 2, for every one percentage point decline in the 3-months Euribor, the 
CapEx-to-sales ratio tends to rise, on average, by 4.19 percentage points. Conversely, 
before 2011Q4 this coefficient is only 1.68 – indicating changes to the 3-months 
Euribor have a much smaller impact on the CapEx-to-sales ratio before Mario Draghi 
entered office. The same, however, cannot be said after 2008Q2 (column 4), where the 
3-months Euribor coefficient is only -0.57.  This result may indicate that the financial 
crisis may have played a role in diminishing the correlation between interest rates and 
capital spending. In other words, perhaps during 2008-2011 – between the global 
recession and the European debt crisis (and before Mario Draghi tenure) – interest rates 
may have had a weaker impact on capital spending than before or after this period.  
These results also correspond to the relationship we have framed in Section 3.2. That is 
to say, falling interest rates tend to encourage companies to allocate more capital 
towards investments. Regarding the ECB’s asset purchase programs, they seem to have 
positively affected companies’ capital spending; however, the coefficients are not vastly 
different across the various time frames. This finding suggests that the ECB’s policies 
do not have a marginally stronger impact on companies’ capital spending decisions after 
2011Q3 or after 2008Q2. Lastly, across the different time frames, the values of R2 range 
between 59.9% and 80.3%. These results indicate our econometric model may identify 
sensible and interpretable relationships among the economic variables in this research. 
  
6.4 Shareholder yield: Empirical results     
 
Table 4 presents the results of the panel data analysis for the shareholder yields model.   
 
[Insert Table 4 here]  
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The results indicate that changes in the ECB’s policies have a stimulating and 
significant impact on companies’ shareholder yield across the different time samples. In 
particular, from 2011 to 2017, for every 1 trillion euros the ECB adds to its balance 
sheet, shareholder yield rises, on average, by 1.33 percentage point (column 5). 
Moreover, for every one percentage point decline in the 3-months Euribor, shareholder 
yield increases, on average, by 0.912 percentage point. We also find that after 2011Q3 
(column 2) the ECB’s policies – mainly related to changes in interest rates (3-months 
Euribor) – seem to have a stronger marginal impact on shareholder yield compared to 
before. The results of the regressions are significant according to the F-tests and the R2 
values throughout the different time frames. The R2 values range from 59.1% to 73.5%. 
Finally, these results also suggest, as indicated in Section 3.2, that lower interest rates 
do not crowd out dividends or buybacks in favor of investments. This finding implies 
that the added value for companies for returning capital to shareholders may have been 
high enough to encourage them to allocate more funds not only to investments but also 
to shareholder distribution.      
 
6.5 A Cross-Country Analysis 
 
In order to analyze how companies from different countries react to ECB’s policies, we 
have also conducted a cross-country analysis. To this end, we have separated the 
companies in our sample according to their country of origin (based on where their head 
offices are located): Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. The results of the panel data 
analysis for the entire period (2000-2017) are presented in Appendix E. These results 
show that, for the debt-to-equity ratio (Table E1), the coefficients for the ECB assets are 
positive and significant across the different countries. However, the ECB’s balance 
sheet variable appears to have the strongest stimulating effect on German companies: 
For every 1 trillion euros the ECB adds to its balance sheet, a German company’s debt-
to-equity ratio rises, on average, by 4.7 percentage points. Conversely, Italian 
companies have the lowest coefficient of 1.51. Moreover, the 3-months Euribor 
coefficients are all negative and significant. However, Spanish and French companies 
have the lowest coefficients at -9.8 and -8.3, respectively. German companies recorded 
the highest 3-months Euribor coefficient. This result suggests that Spanish and French 
companies are more sensitive to changes in interest rates than German companies are. 
Regarding the CapEx-to-sales ratio regressions (Table E2), German companies are the 
least sensitive to changes in the ECB assets or interest rates while Spanish and French 
companies are the most sensitive to the ECB’s policies. Finally, as for shareholder 
yields (Table E3), Italian companies are the least sensitive to changes in the ECB’s 
assets – the coefficient is only 0.267; while the coefficient of Spanish companies is the 
highest in the sample at 3.06. Conversely, Spanish companies are the least sensitive to 
changes in interest rates – with a coefficient of -0.452; while the coefficient of Italian 
companies is the lowest at -1.437. These findings indicate that both Italian and Spanish 
companies are more sensitive to only one (and different) form of the ECB’s policies 
compared to companies from other countries.            
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6.6 A Cross-Industry analysis 
 
Finally, we have also conducted a cross-sector analysis in order to examine whether the 
ECB’s policies have affected differently according to the economic sector. So, we break 
down the sample into 12 industrial sectors18. The results from the panel data regressions 
for the entire sample (2000-2017) are presented in Appendix F. These results for all 
three models indicate that the ECB’s policies – both changes to interest rates and 
balance sheet – have a stimulating effect across the different industrial sectors, as was 
the case in previous analyses. Specifically, in the leverage model (Table F1), the 
Communications sector has the highest ECB assets coefficient at 9.3. Moreover, the 
lowest 3-months Euribor coefficients are for Information Technology, Industrial, and 
Communications at -11.927, -11.927, -11.187, respectively. Regarding the investment 
model (Table F2), Basic Materials have the highest coefficient for changes in the ECB 
assets at 2.78, while the Technology & Telecommunications sector has the lowest 3-
months Euribor coefficient at -2.224. Finally, the results for the shareholder yield model 
(table F3) show that for the changes in the ECB’s assets, the Consumer Cyclical’s 
coefficient is the highest at 4.95; the lowest 3-months Euribor coefficient is for Utilities.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we have examined whether the ECB’s monetary policies have encouraged 
non-financial firms to raise their debt burden, invest more and boost their shareholder 
distribution.  The main results indicate that the answer to all three is yes. However, the 
results also show that these policies seem to have a stronger marginal impact on these 
companies’ decisions not only after the global recession of 2008 but also after late 2011 
– as the Euro debt crisis was unfolding and Mario Draghi entered office, and 
dramatically changed the ECB’s policies. We also find that French and Spanish 
companies appear more sensitive to changes in the ECB’s policies on issues of 
investments and leverage. This finding might have policy implications: The ECB’s 
main asset purchase program (PSPP) allocates its funds based on a country’s size (GDP) 
rather than its need. The results suggest that the ECB’s policies could boost investments 
of non-financial firms more efficiently if the ECB were to allocate more funds to 
countries, such as France and Spain, where companies react more strongly to its 
policies.  Finally, one of the main goals the ECB set out to do via its stimulative 
monetary policies was to encourage companies to invest in the economy, which should 
lead to higher economic growth. As in every empirical analysis, the results must be 
regarded with caution, since they are based on a set of countries and companies over a 
certain period and a given econometric methodology. Nonetheless, we show that while 
the ECB’s policies seem to have done so, the policies may have also encouraged 
companies to use the low interest rate environment to distribute capital to their 
                                                
18 The list of industries is: Basic Materials, Communications, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Cyclical, Consumer Non-Cyclical, 
Energy, Industrial, Information Technology, Materials, Technology & Telecommunications, and Utilities 
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shareholders. Even though share buybacks and dividends could play a role in boosting 
economic activity19, their stimulative impact on the economy is indirect and unclear.   
  
 
References: 
1. Arce, Ó., Gimeno, R., and Mayordomo, S., (2018). The effects of the Eurosystem’s 
corporate sector purchase programme on Spanish companies, Economic Bulletin, 
Banco de España. 
2. Baumeister, C. and Benati, L. (2010). Unconventional Monetary Policy and the 
Great Recession - Estimating the Impact of a Compression in the Yield Spread at 
the Zero Lower Bound. ECB Working Paper No. 1258.  
3. Barry B.C., Mann S. C., Mihov V., Mauricio R. (2008). Corporate Debt Issuance 
and the Historical Level of Interest Rates. Financial Management, Vol.37:413-430.  
4. Bernhardt, D. Douglas, A. Robertson, F. (2002).  Testing dividend signaling models. 
Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol.12 (1): 77-98. 
5. Bernanke, B. and Reinhart, V. (2004). Conducting Monetary Policy at Very Low 
Short-Term Interest Rates. American Economic Review,Vol. 94: 85–90 
6. Blundell, R. W. and Roulet R. (2013). Long term investment, the cost of capital and 
the dividend and buyback puzzle. OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 2013/1.  
7. Black, F. and Scholes, M. (1974). The effects of dividend yield and dividend policy 
on common stock prices and returns. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 1 (1): 1-
22.  
8. Breitung, J. (2000). The local power of some unit root tests for panel data. In 
Advances in Econometrics, Volume 15: Nonstationary Panels, Panel Cointegration, 
and Dynamic Panels, ed. B. H. Baltagi, 161–178. Amsterdam: JAI Press. 
9. Choi, I. (2001). Unit root tests for panel data. Journal of International Money and 
Finance, Vol. 20: 249–272. 
10. Cycon, Lisa and Koetter, Michael. (2015). Monetary Policy Under the Microscope: 
Intra-Bank Transmission of Asset Purchase Programs of the ECB (July 31, 2015). 
IWH Discussion Papers No. 9 / 2015, Halle Institute for Economic Research. 
11. Daetz, S.L. Subrahmanyam, M.G. Tang, D.Y. Wang, S.Q. (2016). Did ECB 
Liquidity Injections Help the Real Economy in Europe? The Impact of 
Unconventional Monetary Interventions on Corporate Policies. Paper presented at 
the 43rd European Finance Association Annual Meeting (EFA 2016), Oslo, 
Norway. 
12. Darracq-Paries. M.  De Santis, R.A. (2015). A non-standard monetary policy shock: 
The ECB's 3-year LTROs and the shift in credit supply. Journal of International 
Money and Finance, Vol. 54 (C): 1-34 
                                                
19 The excess capital shareholders receive could be used to reallocate funds to firms that require capital for investment. 
Shareholders could use the funds to increase their spending, which, in turn, could also boost economic activity. Nonetheless, not all 
shareholders live in the EMU so that the spending could be done abroad. Also, shareholders could decide to invest in companies 
outside the EMU. These points only show that it is unclear how shareholder distribution could affect the economy. 
17 
 
13. Denis D. J., Osobov, I. (2008). Why do firms pay dividends? International evidence 
on the determinants of dividend policy. Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.89 (1): 
62-82.  
14. Draghi, M. (2012). Speech by at the Global Investment Conference in London, 26 
July_2012. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html 
15. Eije, H. v., Megginson W. L. (2008). Dividends and share repurchases in the 
European Union, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 89 (2): 347-374  
16. Fama, Eugene F. and Gibbons, Michael R., (1982), Inflation, real returns and capital 
investment, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 9 (3): 297-323.  
17. Fama F. Eugene, French, R. Kenneth. (2002). Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order 
Predictions About Dividends and Debt, The Review of Financial Studies, Vol.15 (1): 
1–33.  
18. Fairchild, J. R. (2006). When Do Share Repurchases Increase Shareholder Wealth? 
Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. 16 (1).  
19. Fernandez-Rodriguez, F., Sosvilla Rivero, S. y Andrada-Felix, J. (1999). Exchange-
rate forecasts with simultaneous nearest-neighbour methods: evidence from the 
EMS. International Journal of Forecasting, Vol. 15: 383-392. 
20. Frank, Murray Z. Goyal, Vidhan K., Profits and Capital Structure (March 11, 2008). 
AFA 2009 San Francisco Meetings Paper.  
21. Frankfurter, G. M. Wood, B. G. (2002). Dividend policy theories and their empirical 
tests. International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 11 (2): 111-138. 
22. Gagnon, J. E., Sack, B. (2018). QE: A User’s Guide. Policy Brief. Peterson Institute 
for International Economics.  
23. Gagnon, J. E., (2016). Quantitative Easing: An Underappreciated Success. Policy 
Brief. Peterson Institute for International Economics.  
24. Gambacorta, L., Hofmann, B., Peersman, G. (2014). The effectiveness of 
unconventional monetary policy at the zero-lower bound: a cross-country analysis. 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 46: 615-642. 
25. Garrett, I., and Priestley, R. (2000). Dividend Behavior and Dividend 
Signaling. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 35(2): 173-189.  
26. Giannone, D., Lenza, M., Pill, H., Reichlin, L., (2012a). The ECB and the interbank 
market. Economic Journal, Vol.122: 467-486. 
27. Giannone, D., Lenza, M., Reichlin, L., (2012b). Money, Credit, Monetary Policy 
and the Business Cycle in the Euro Area. ECARES Working Paper Series, n. 8. 
28. Gup, B. E. and Nam, D. (2001). Stock Buybacks, Corporate performance and Eva. 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 14: 99–110.  
29. Hansen, A.  (1939). Economic progress and declining population growth. American 
Economic Review, Vol.29: 1-15. 
30. Harris, R. D. F., and E. Tzavalis. (1999). Inference for unit roots in dynamic panels 
where the time dimension is fixed. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 91: 201–226. 
18 
 
31. Hussainey, K., Chijoke Oscar Mgbame, Aruoriwo M. Chijoke‐
Mgbame, (2011) "Dividend policy and share price volatility: UK evidence", The 
Journal of Risk Finance, Vol. 12 (1): 57-68.  
32. Im, K. S., M. H. Pesaran, and Y. Shin. (2003). Testing for unit roots in 
heterogeneous panels. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 115: 53–74. 
33. Kanga, K. D., Levieuge, G. (2017). “An assessment of the effects of unconventional 
monetary policies on the cost of credit to non-financial companies in the eurozone”. 
Economie et statistique, October 2017, pp. 91-110. 
34. King, G., Honaker, J., Joseph, A., Scheve, K. (2001). Analyzing incomplete political 
science data: an alternative algorithm for multiple imputation. American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 95: 49–69. 
35. Koo, R. (2011). The world in balance sheet recession: causes, cure, and politics. 
Real-World Economics Review, 58.  
36. Koo, R. (2013). Balance sheet recession as the ‘other half’ of macroeconomics. 
European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention, Vol.10: 136-
157 
37. Kraus, A. and Litzenberger, R. (1973). A State Preference Model of Optimal 
Financial Leverage. The Journal of Finance, Vol.28: 911-922 
38. Krugman, P. R. (1998). It's baaack: Japan's slump and the return of the liquidity 
trap. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol.29:137-205 
39. Krugman, P. R. and Eggertsson G. B. (2012). Debt, Deleveraging, and the Liquidity 
Trap: A Fisher-Minsky-Koo Approach. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
127: 1469-1513 
40. Kühnhausen, F. and Stieber, H. W. (2014). Determinants of capital structure in non-
financial companies. Munich Discussion Paper No. 2014-38, Department of 
Economics, University of Munich, Munich. 
41. Lenza, M., Pill, H., Reichlin, L., (2010). Monetary policy in exceptional times. 
Economic Policy, Vol. 62: 295-339. 
42. Levin, A., C.-F. Lin, and C.-S. J. Chu. (2002). Unit root tests in panel data: 
Asymptotic and finite-sample properties. Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 108:1–24. 
43. McNally, W. (1999). Open Market Stock Repurchase Signaling. Financial 
Management, Vol. 28(2): 55-67.  
44. Merton, R. (1974). On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest 
Rates. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 29(2):  449-470.  
45. Miller, M., & Modigliani, F. (1961). Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of 
Shares. The Journal of Business, Vol. 34(4):  411-433.  
46. Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and 
the Theory of Investment. American Economic Review, Vol. 53:261–297 
47. Modigliani, F. (1982), Debt, Dividend Policy, Taxes, Inflation and Market 
Valuation. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 37: 255–273.  
19 
 
48. Myers, S. C. (1984), The Capital Structure Puzzle. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 39: 
574–592 
49. Nechio, F. (2011). Monetary policy when one size does not fit all. FRBSF Economic 
Letter 2011-18, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA. 
50. Orphanides, A. (2004). Monetary policy in deflation: the liquidity trap in history and 
practice. The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol.15:101-124 
51. Peersman, G., (2011). Macroeconomic Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy 
in the Euro Area. CEPR Working Paper, n. 8348. 
52. Rappaport, A., and Taggart, R. (1982). Evaluation of Capital Expenditure Proposals 
under Inflation. Financial Management, Vol. 11(1):5-13.  
53. Rajan, R. G. and Zingales, L. (1995). What do I know about capital structure? Some 
evidence from international data.  Journal of Finance, Vol.50: 1421-1460. 
54. Summers, L. (2013). Why stagnation might prove to be the new normal. Financial 
Times. 15 December 2013. 
55. Wald, J. (1999). Capital structure with dividend restrictions, Journal of Corporate 
Finance, Vol.5 (2): 193-208.  
56. Wang, C. S., Strong, N. C., Tung, S and Lin, S. W. J., (2008). Share Repurchases, 
the Clustering Problem, and the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis. Financial 
Management.  
57. Wu, J. C. and Xia, F. D. (2016). Measuring the macroeconomic impact of monetary 
policy at the zero lower bound. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol.48: 253-
291. 
20 
 
Appendix A: Description of variables and data sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description Source 
EBITDA-to-revenue EBITDA-to-revenue of a company Bloomberg 
WACC Weighted Average Cost of capital of a company  Bloomberg 
Spread between 10 year and 3 
months Euribor 
Gap between weighted average yield of a 10-year of 
EMU governments note and 3-months libor in euros 
Eurostat and Fred 
ECB total assets Total assets on the ECB’s balance sheet (in trillions 
of euros) 
FRED 
3-months Euribor rate Weighted average rate of a 3-months libor in euros FRED 
10-year EU government bond Weighted average yield of a 10-year of EMU 
governments note 
Eurostat 
Total Debt The total long term and short term of a company as 
recorded on its balance sheet  
Bloomberg 
EPS growth Quarter-on-quarter rate of growth of earnings per 
share  
Eurostat 
Inflation Year-on-year rate of growth of Harmonized Index of 
Consumer Price in EMU (HICP) 
Eurostat 
Debt-to-equity Non-Financial Corporate debt to equity ratio  Bloomberg 
Shareholder yield Returns to investors per share – including buybacks, 
dividends and deleverage per company 
Bloomberg 
CapEx-to-sales Capital spending per revenue of a company Bloomberg 
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Appendix B: The ECB’s Assets and Quantitative Easing 
 
Figure B1: The ECB assets and non-QE assets (millions of euros); Ratio of QE to 
total ECB assets (right axis) 
 
 
 
 
Table B1: List of the ECB’s QE programs  
The ECB assets and various QE programs, as of Dec 2017 
(millions of euros)   Percent of total    Gain since Oct 2014*  
The ECB assets 4,471,689 100% 2,038,235 
CBPP3 243,752 5% 243,752 
ABSPP 25,014 1% 25,014 
CSPP 131,593 3% 131,593 
PSPP 1,931,239 43% 1,931,239 
 Note: The total gain in the ECB assets is less than the total gain in the QE programs listed above. The reason is 
that some programs have winded down over the years such as the LTRO and reduced the ECB assets.  
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Appendix C: Euribor, EU Yields and The ECB’s Interest Rates 
 
Figure C1: Euribor (3-months, 1 week, overnight), ECB shadow rate and ECB 
Deposit facility 2001-2018 
 
Source of data: FRED, Jing Cynthia Wu’s website for shadow rate and the ECB’s website 
 
 
Table C1: Linear correlations of different internet rates and std. deviations  
Correlations 
2001-2018 
3-months 
Euribor  
Overnight 
Euribor 
1-week 
Euribor Shadow rate Deposit facility 
Overnight 
Euribor 0.751         
1-week Euribor 0.863 0.927       
Shadow rate 0.452 0.410 0.470     
Deposit facility 0.697 0.653 0.717 0.403   
Std. Dev. 1.599 1.533 1.548 2.912 1.090 
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Appendix D: Tests for unit root 
 
LLC denotes the Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root with Ho: Panels contain unit roots and Ha: Panels are stationary 
HT represents the Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test with Ho: Panels contain unit roots and Ha: Panels are stationary  
Breitung is the Breitung unit-root test with Ho: Panels contain unit roots and Ha: Panels are stationary 
IPS denotes the Im-Pesaran-Shin unit-root test with Ho: All panels contain unit roots and Ha: Some panels are stationary 
Fisher(ADF) represents the Fisher-type unit-root test based on augmented Dickey-Fuller tests with Ho: All panels contain unit 
roots and Ha: At least one panel is stationary 
Fisher(PP) is the Fisher-type unit-root test based on Phillips-Perron tests with Ho: All panels contain unit roots and Ha: At 
least one panel is stationary 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable LLC HT Breitung IPS Fisher(ADF) Fisher(PP) 
WACC -8.3439*** 0.8428*** 
-
11.1838*** -2.6407*** 277.7692*** 277.7692*** 
Shareholder yield 
-
16.4426*** 
0.7345 
*** -7.4528*** -3.5964*** 702.5072*** 702.5072*** 
Debt-to-equity 
-
15.8260*** 0.8539*** -6.6381*** -6.4830*** 308.5653*** 308.5653*** 
CapEx-to-Sales 
-
17.9772*** 0.8315*** 
-
14.0383*** -9.2027*** 1264.7517*** 1264.7517*** 
EPS 
-
22.4463*** 0.5271*** 
-
13.8662*** -8.5641*** 1271.6925*** 1271.6925*** 
EBITDA-to-sales 
-
18.0776*** 0.5109*** 
-
18.2389*** 
-
11.0369*** 1484.3477*** 1484.3477*** 
Spread 10y-3mo 
yield -7.1622*** 0.9175*** 
-
11.7074*** -9.9545*** 387.7816*** 121.0040*** 
3 mo Euribor  -9.5504*** 0.0000*** 
-
46.0420*** -4.6214*** 171.7552*** 134.8042*** 
Inflation 
-
11.6715*** 0.8943*** 
-
14.6981*** -1.9569*** 446.9590*** 250.2261*** 
ECB assets 21.8598 1.0339 24.4366 20.0003 0.2100 0.2100 
D(ECB assets) 63.7046 0.0280*** 
-
40.3748*** 
-
24.4600*** 4434.0483*** 4434.0483*** 
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Appendix E: Tests by countries 
 
  Table E1: Results of panel analysis for the debt-to-equity equation by countries 
OLS Estimates of the Effect 
of the ECB’s policies on 
Leverage 
Dependent variable: Debt-
to-sales 
All sample France Germany Italy Spain 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D(ECB Assets (t-1)) 0.171*** 2.19** 4.73** 1.51*** 2.25** 
3 Mo Yld (t-1) -3.459*** -8.301** -0.693** -2.223** -9.809** 
EPS (t-1) -2.437*** -1.626*** -3.849*** -0.056** -0.931** 
WACC -8.214*** -11.689*** -4.460** -9.854** -1.543** 
EBITDA to Revenue (t-
1) 
0.159*** 0.454*** 0.058*** 0.682** 0.8535** 
EU inflation (t-1) 4.300*** 5.529*** 0.763*** 4.744** 3.218** 
Constant 154.77*** 189.12*** 121.22** 196.21** 89.41** 
   
Statistics 
  R-squared (overall) 75.50% 74.65% 71.32% 73.91% 72.19% 
F-statistic 53.40*** 47.31*** 18.97*** 8.00*** 18.87*** 
Total Obs. 3160 1944 1224 934 360 
Cross sections 62 27 17 13 5 
Hausman Test (Chi-Sq 
Stat.) 
36.01*** 10.52** 22.42 5.12 98.75*** 
RE/FE FE FE FE RE FE 
This table reports the results of estimating an equation for a balanced panel of 62 publicly traded 
non-financial firms over the period 2001.Q2- 2017.Q4.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
  Table E2: Results of panel analysis for the capital expenditures equation for 
countries 
OLS Estimates of the Effect of the ECB’s 
policies on investments 
Dependent variable: CapEx-to-sales 
All sample France Germany Italy Spain 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D(ECB Assets (t-1)) 2.98** 6.96*** 0.282*** 0.309*** 3.25*** 
3 Mo Yld (t-1) -1.501** -2.211*** -0.212** -0.636** -2.712*** 
EU inflation (t-1) -0.997*** -1.766*** -0.001** -0.271** -2.067** 
EBITDA-to revenue (t-1) 0.125** 0.614** 0.072** 0.132*** 0.125** 
Spread 10 Year Y and 3 mo Libor (t-
1) 
0.623*** 1.115** 0.220*** 0.421*** 2.036** 
WACC (t-1) -0.268*** -1.104*** -0.368*** -0.492** -2.568** 
Constant 15.65** 32.06** 8.92** 4.26** 14.58** 
Statistics 
R-squared (overall) 72.00% 71.94% 72.35% 73.84% 71.46% 
F-statistic 5.61*** 6.94*** 7.31*** 12.26*** 8.53*** 
Total Obs. 4462 1944 1224 934 360 
Cross sections 62 27 17 13 5 
Hausman Test (Chi-Sq Stat.) 63.30*** 118.76*** 0.97 12.44** 108.35*** 
RE/FE FE FE RE FE FE 
 
This table reports the results of estimating an equation for a balanced panel of 62 publicly traded 
non-financial firms over the period 2001.Q2- 2017.Q4.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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  Table E3: Results of panel analysis for the shareholder yield equation for 
countries 
OLS Estimates of the Effect 
of the ECB’s policies on 
dividends and buybacks 
Dependent variable: 
Shareholder yield 
All sample France Germany Italy Spain 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D(ECB Assets (t-1)) 1.33*** 1.64*** 1.14*** 0.267*** 3.06** 
3 Mo Yld (t-1) -0.912*** -0.832*** -0.822** -1.437** -0.452*** 
EPS (t-1) 0.108** 0.013** 0.358** 0.088** 0.211** 
WACC (t-1) 0.437** 0.176** 0.618** 0.498** 0.630** 
Constant -0.706** 2.020** -3.467** -0.152** -4.139** 
Statistics 
R-squared (overall) 73.50% 74.15% 73.29% 71.83% 71.34% 
F-statistic 103,52** 14.65*** 7.64*** 10.80*** 5.21*** 
Total Obs. 4463 1944 1224 934 360 
Cross sections 62 27 17 13 5 
Hausman Test (Chi-Sq 
Stat.) 
1.93 1.95 2.05 1.12 0.82 
RE/FE RE RE RE RE RE 
This table reports the results of estimating an equation for a balanced panel of 62 publicly traded 
non-financial firms over the period 2001.Q2- 2017.Q4.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Appendix F: Tests by industries  
  Table F1: Sectorial results of panel analysis for the debt-to-equity equation 
 
OLS Estimates of the Effect 
of the ECB’s policies on 
Leverage 
Dependent variable: Debt-
to-sales 
All industries 
Basic 
Materials Communications 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Cyclical 
Consumer 
Non-Cyclical Energy Industrial 
Information 
Technology Materials 
Technology & 
Telecommunications Utilities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
D(ECB Assets (t-1)) 0.1711*** 6.47** 9.30** 3.90*** 8.51*** 2.71*** 6.61*** 0.455** 0.455** 5.50*** 0.547** 3.37** 
3 Mo Yld (t-1) -3.459*** -1.442** -11.187** -4.144** -9.948** -1.794*** -9.448** -11.927** -11.927** -1.126** -2.919** -6.441** 
EPS (t-1) -2.437*** -11.807*** -1.807*** -13.276** -1.061** -0.968** -1.732** -1.192** -1.192** -9.382** -2.134** -0.706** 
WACC -8.214*** -7.557** -24.751** -0.821** -10.857** -2.128** -0.885** -2.873** -2.873** -1.266** -1.007** -3.296*** 
EBITDA to Revenue (t-1) 0.159*** 0.680*** 0.305** 0.573** 0.868** 0.968** 1.733** 1.062** 1.062** 0.135** 0.115** 0.033** 
EU inflation (t-1) 4.300*** 4.839*** 3.129*** 0.965** 2.718** 1.794*** 1.532** 2.541*** 2.541*** 1.912** 2.176** 2.785*** 
Constant 154.77*** 74.11*** 157.99** 83.90** 207.87** 87.70** 58.72** 274.05** 274.05** 36.76** 38.96** 94.03** 
     
Statistics 
      
  
R-squared (overall) 75.50% 74.32% 71.32% 70.87% 71.73% 72.46% 73.14% 74.73% 74.73% 72.75% 72.75% 71.34% 
F-statistic 53.40*** 5.98*** 23.17*** 8.72*** 36.73*** 7.87*** 43.54*** 26.66*** 26.66*** 6.99*** 5.67*** 21.37*** 
Total Obs. 3160 144 360 288 864 576 360 720 720 144 214 214 
Cross sections 62 2 5 4 12 8 5 10 10 2 3 3 
Hausman Test (Chi-Sq 
Stat.) 
36.01*** 13.33*** 0.75 30.98*** 73.11*** 20.55*** 0.91 23.45*** 0.19 0.31 53.85*** 34.89*** 
RE/FE FE FE RE FE FE FE RE FE RE RE FE FE 
This table reports the results of estimating an equation for a balanced panel of 62 publicly traded non-financial firms over the period 2001.Q2- 2017.Q4.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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  Table F2: Sectorial results of panel analysis for the capital expenditures equation  
 
 
OLS Estimates of the Effect of the 
ECB’s policies on investments 
Dependent variable: CapEx-to-sales 
All industries 
Basic 
Materials Communications 
Consumer 
Discretionary Consumer Cyclical 
Consumer 
Non-Cyclical Energy Industrial 
Information 
Technology Materials 
Technology & 
Telecommunications Utilities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
D(ECB Assets (t-1)) 2.98** 2.78*** 0.297*** 2.68*** 0.122*** 0.455*** 2.64*** 0.224*** 1.80*** 0.234** 1.87*** 0.323*** 
3 Mo Yld (t-1) -1.501** -0.439** -0.327** -0.636** -0.354** -0.128** -1.867*** -0.232*** -1.489** 
-
0.605*** 
-2.224** -0.571** 
EU inflation (t-1) -0.997*** -0.042*** -0.092** -0.990** -0.649** -0.094** -1.657** -0.017*** -1.021** -0.948** -0.168** -0.211** 
EBITDA-to revenue (t-1) 0.125** 0.039** 0.036** 0.033*** 0.237** 0.048*** 0.370** 0.018** 0.303** 0.073** 0.313*** 0.233** 
Spread 10 Year Y and 3 mo Libor (t-1) 0.623*** 0.474*** 0.525*** 0.515** 1.595*** 0.287** 0.555** 0.118*** 1.088** 2.206** 0.965** 0.176** 
WACC (t-1) -0.268*** -0.102*** -0.210*** -1.257*** -0.251** -0.184*** -1.838*** -0.056** -0.126** -1.199** -0.141** -0.203** 
Constant 15.65** 11.83** 9.05** -6.25** 12.04** 7.17** -7.28** 4.39** 3.48** 25.14** -5.76** 9.36** 
     
Statistics 
     
    
R-squared (overall) 72.00% 73.12% 72.53% 73.84% 72.56% 72.31% 72.87% 71.93% 70.36% 71.82% 71.30% 71.23% 
F-statistic 5.61*** 4.53*** 3.77*** 4.57*** 3.99*** 8.21*** 9.01*** 10.18*** 13.24*** 9.20*** 8.60*** 5.56*** 
Total Obs. 4462 144 360 288 864 576 360 720 144 214 214 360 
Cross sections 62 2 5 4 12 8 6 10 2 3 3 5 
Hausman Test (Chi-Sq Stat.) 63.30*** 79.90*** 7.99** 12.44** 2,28 0.49 0.08 1.69 1.15 24.58*** 12.24*** 2.11 
RE/FE FE FE FE FE RE RE RE RE RE FE FE RE 
This table reports the results of estimating an equation for a balanced panel of 62 publicly traded non-financial firms over the period 2001.Q2- 2017.Q4.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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 Table F3: Sectorial results of panel analysis for the shareholder yield equation 
 
 
OLS Estimates of the 
Effect of the ECB’s 
policies on dividends 
and buybacks 
Dependent variable: 
Shareholder yield 
All industries 
Basic 
Materials Communications 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Cyclical 
Consumer Non-
Cyclical Energy Industrial 
Information 
Technology Materials 
Technology & 
Telecommunications Utilities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
D(ECB Assets (t-1)) 1.33*** 0.515*** 0.417*** 4.95*** 1.09** 0.164*** 0.103*** 0.161*** 3.55*** 2.84*** 2.12*** 0.353*** 
3 Mo Yld (t-1) -0.912*** -0.471** -1.746** -0.267** -0.120** -0.250** -1.433** -1.385** -0.263*** -1.312*** -1.005*** -2.871*** 
EPS (t-1) 0.108** 1.800** 1.983*** 2.180** 0.324** 0.139** 0.225** 0.350** 0.467** 1.312*** 0.736*** 0.184** 
WACC (t-1) 0.437** 0.748** 0.645** 0.165*** 0.722*** 0.309** 1.563*** 0.422*** 0.496*** 1.777** 0.156** 0.451** 
Constant -0.706** -0.234** 3.693** 3.946** -5.850** -1.218** -11.963** -1.939** -3.529** -10.412** 3.492** 7.497** 
     
Statistics 
       R-squared (overall) 73.50% 72.80% 73.40% 72.43% 72.62% 72.80% 73.10% 74.20% 72.50% 73.20% 74.60% 72,25% 
F-statistic 103,52** 11.11*** 9.77*** 7.55*** 4.15*** 5.44*** 5.59*** 7.81*** 3.67** 4.64*** 3.42*** 9.94*** 
Total Obs. 4463 144 360 288 864 576 360 720 144 214 214 36' 
Cross sections 62 2 5 4 12 8 5 10 2 3 3 5 
Hausman Test (Chi-Sq 
Stat.) 
1.93 1.58 0.20 0.48 0.56 3.3 18.45*** 9.29*** 1.66 16.81*** 1.88 0.86 
RE/FE RE RE RE RE RE RE FE FE RE FE RE RE 
This table reports the results of estimating an equation for a balanced panel of 62 publicly traded non-financial firms over the period 2001.Q2- 2017.Q4.  
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Figure 1: Euro Area investment and 10- year EU yield, quarterly data, 1999-
2017  
 
           Source: Eurostat and European central bank data warehouse   
 
 
  
 
              Figure 2: Capital formation in selected EMU countries and capital 
spending of firms in the sample, 2001-2016  
 
                  Source: Bloomberg and author’s calculations and Eurostat 
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              Figure 3: Private debt in selected EMU countries and total debt of firms in 
the sample, 2001-2016  
 
               Source: Bloomberg and author’s calculations and Eurostat 
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Table 1: List of the ECB's major monetary policy changes since Mario Draghi 
entered office  
List of the ECB's major monetary policy changes since Mario 
Draghi entered office  
Date Policy  
3 Nov. 2011 Cut deposit rates by 25 bp to 0.5%; 
8 Dec. 2011 Cut deposit rates by 25 bp to 0.25%;  
5 Jul. 2012 Cut deposit rates by 25 bp to 0%; 
2 May 2013 
Cut main refinancing operations 
(MRO) rates by 25 bp to 0.5%; 
7 Nov. 2013 
Cut main refinancing operations 
(MRO) rates by 25 bp to 0.25%; 
5 Jun. 2014 
First introduced the Targeted longer-
term refinancing operations programme  
5 Jun. 2014 Cut deposit rates by 10 bp to -0.1%; 
4 Sep. 2014 Cut deposit rates by 10 bp to -0.2%; 
15  Oct. 2014 
First introduced the covered bond 
purchase programme 
19 Nov. 2014 
First introduced the asset-backed 
securities purchase programme 
4  Mar. 2015 
First introduced the public sector 
purchase programme  
3 Dec. 2015 Cut deposit rates by 10 bp to -0.3%; 
10 Mar. 2016 
First introduced the corporate sector 
purchase programme  
10 Mar. 2016 Cut deposit rates by 10 bp to -0.4%; 
Source: The ECB’s website 
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      Table 2: Results of panel analysis for Debt-to-equity 
OLS Estimates of the Effect of the ECB’s policies on Leverage 
Dependent variable: Debt-to-equity 
  
2001Q2-
2011Q3 
2011Q4-
2017Q4 
2001Q2-
2008Q1 
2008Q2-
2017Q4 
2001Q2- 
2017Q4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D(ECB Assets (t-1)) 1.22** 8.56*** 1.25** 65.4** 0.1711*** 
3 Mo Yld (t-1) -1.174*** -2.495** -0.655*** -3.968*** -3.459*** 
EPS (t-1) -2.129*** -1.213*** -1.872*** -2.804*** -2.437*** 
WACC -7.547*** -4.396*** -6.506** -3.802*** -8.214*** 
EBITDA to Revenue (t-1) 0.028*** 0.058*** 0.120** 0.542*** 0.159*** 
EU inflation (t-1) 0.947*** 1.768*** 7.034** 1.086*** 4.300*** 
Constant 162.11*** 130.81*** 149.38*** 130.88*** 154.77*** 
 Statistics 
R-squared (overall) 81.4% 82.7% 83.3% 66.7% 75.5% 
F-statistic 49.28*** 22.54*** 51.50*** 54.71*** 53.40*** 
Total Obs. 3160 1240 2044 2480 4462 
Cross sections 62 62 62 62 62 
Hausman Test (Chi-Sq Stat.) 34.91*** 47.35*** 32.12*** 79.21*** 36.01*** 
RE/FE FE FE FE FE FE 
These tables show the results of estimating an equation for a balanced panel of 62 publicly traded non-financial 
firms. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3: Results of panel analysis for CapEx-to-Sales 
OLS Estimates of the Effect of the ECB’s policies on investments 
Dependent variable: CapEx-to-sales 
  
2001Q2-
2011Q3 
2011Q4-
2017Q4 
2001Q2-
2008Q1 
2008Q2-
2017Q4 
2001Q2- 
2017Q4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D(ECB Assets (t-1)) 2.98** 1.63** 2.76** 1.38** 
 
2.98** 
3 Mo Yld (t-1) -1.679** -4.189** -2.176** -0.570** -1.501** 
EU inflation (t-1) -1.159** -1.305*** -7.045** -0.294*** -0.997*** 
EBITDA-to revenue (t-1) 0.027** 0.084*** 0.029** 0.036*** 0.125** 
Spread 10 Year Y and 3 mo 
Libor (t-1) 0.216** 0.011** 1.290** 0.44794*** 0.623*** 
WACC (t-1) -0.4131*** -0.0845*** -1.022*** -0.0125** -0.268*** 
Constant 12.72** 7.10** 62.26*** -33.43*** 15.65** 
 Statistics 
R-squared (overall) 67.5% 59.9% 80.3% 79.1% 72.0% 
F-statistic 2.88** 2.71** 12.24*** 11.26*** 5.61*** 
Total Obs. 3160 2040 1150 2480 4462 
Cross sections 62 62 64 62 62 
Hausman Test (Chi-Sq Stat.) 26.32*** 7.09** 15.28*** 74.73* 63.30*** 
RE/FE FE FE FE FE FE 
These tables show the results of estimating an equation for a balanced panel of 62-64 publicly traded non-financial 
companies. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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 Table 4: Results of panel analysis for Shareholder Yield 
OLS Estimates of the Effect of the ECB’s policies on dividends and buybacks 
Dependent variable: Shareholder yield 
  
2000Q2-
2011Q3 
2011Q4-
2017Q4 
2000Q2-
2008Q1 
2008Q2-
2017Q4 
2001Q2-
2017Q4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
D(ECB Assets (t-1)) 1.41*** 2.40** 0.965** 2.67*** 1.33*** 
3 Mo Yld (t-1) -0.839** -2.759*** -0.315** -0.860** -0.912*** 
EPS (t-1) 0.262** 0.485*** 0.347** 0.095** 0.108** 
WACC (t-1) 0.521** 0.856*** 0.667*** 0.493*** 0.437** 
Constant -1.533** -4.051*** -4.645** -0.921** -0.706** 
 Statistics 
R-squared (overall) 65.1% 62.8% 59.1% 65.2% 73.5% 
F statistic 67.18** 22.64*** 12.70* 34.68*** 103.52*** 
Total Obs. 3160 1240 2044 2480 4463 
Cross sections 62 62 62 62 62 
Hausman Test (Chi-Sq Stat.) 4.28 12.78*** 15.43*** 3.92 1.93 
RE/FE RE FE FE RE RE 
These tables show the results of estimating an equation for a balanced panel of 62 publicly traded non-financial 
companies. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
